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Abstract 
 
South Africa (SA) has pursued corporate governance reforms in the form of the 1994 and 
2002 King Reports. This paper examines the association between the presence of 
independent non-executive directors (INEDs) and market valuation of a sample of 169 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in SA from 2002 to 2007. Our 
results suggest a statistically significant and positive relationship between the presence of 
INEDs and firm valuation. By contrast, we find no statistically significant association 
between the presence of non-executive directors (NEDs) and firm valuation. Our findings 
are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of 
endogeneity problems, non-linear associations and firm valuation proxies. Our findings 
have important policy and regulatory implications. Whereas our evidence that more 
independent corporate boards’ impacts positively on firm valuation provides support for the 
recommendations of the King Reports, it shows that to be meaningful, director 
independence has to be more carefully and strictly defined. 
 
Keywords King reports, Corporate governance, Firm valuation, Independent non-executive 
directors, Johannesburg stock exchange, South Africa, Endogeneity 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the presence of independent non-executive 
directors (INEDs) on market valuation of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) in South Africa (SA). Close to two decades of corporate governance (CG) reforms 
have been embarked on in SA, primarily in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports. A 
broader objective of the King Reports has been to raise CG standards in SA firms 
(Armstrong et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2011a). A more specific aim of the reforms, however, 
has been to improve firm valuation by enhancing the independence and monitoring capacity 
of SA boards of directors (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011b). A 
major proxy for corporate boards’ independence and monitoring capacity is the proportion 
of outside directors (INEDs) (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993). In fact, the ongoing extensive public policy (Pfeffer, 1973; Fama, 
1980; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) and academic (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Dalton et al., 1998; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Al-Najjar 
and Hussainey, 2009) debate on the role and effectiveness of INEDs suggests that the 
presence of INEDs on corporate boards may influence firm value.  
However, and whereas there is a theoretical agreement that INEDs perform crucial 
roles in improving corporate monitoring and valuation (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993; 
McDonald et al., 2008), the empirical evidence on the effect of the presence of INEDs on 
firm valuation is mixed. A number of reasons, however, have been suggested that may 
account for the conflicting results of prior studies. Firstly, there is the issue of clearly 
defining who constitutes an INED, with most past studies simply classifying all outside 
directors as non-executive directors (NEDs) (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Weir and 
Laing, 2000). However, some outside directors may have significant interests or 
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connections with corporate executives (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Bozec, 2005; Gupta and 
Fields, 2009), which can impair their independence, and thereby their ability to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline management (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Jiraporn et al., 
2009). This suggests that a much subtle and stricter definition of who is an INED has to be 
introduced if her/his independence and monitoring capacity is not to be compromised.  
Secondly, past studies have been criticised for potential methodological deficiencies, 
with most of them mainly using ordinary least square regressions (OLS), in addition to not 
sufficiently accounting for endogeneity problems (El Mehdi, 2007; Kyereboah et al., 2006; 
Sunday, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010), and thereby leading to spurious results. Thirdly, it has 
been argued that the association between INEDs and firm valuation may not just differ by 
company-level features, but also by differences in country-level CG and institutional 
characteristics (Ho and Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010). Despite this development, existing studies 
examining the effect of the presence of INEDs on firm valuation are mainly concentrated in 
a few developed countries that exhibit relatively similar institutional settings (Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Ben-Amar and Zeghal, 2011).  
With respect to the African setting, a number of studies have analysed the impact of 
CG structures on a number of issues, such as financing decisions of firms (Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a; Abor, 2007; Abor and Biekpe, 2007), incidences of listing 
suspensions (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) and  dividend performance (Bokpin, 2011). A 
limited number of studies have also investigated the effects of different CG mechanisms, 
such as the frequency of board meetings (El Mehdi, 2007; Ntim and Osei, 2011), ownership 
structure (Mangena and Tauringana, 2008; Sand et al., 2010), board size (Ho and Williams, 
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2003; Kyereboah-Coleman et al., 2006) and board composition (Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Biekpe, 2006b; Sunday, 2008) on corporate performance with equally inconclusive results. 
Apart from apparent conflicting findings and methodological weaknesses that have been 
highlighted, an additional problem with these studies is the excessive use of limited 
samples of firms[1], and thereby making generalisation of findings difficult. 
However, it is reasonable to argue that in developing economies with different CG 
practices and institutional settings (as will be further elaborated), the effectiveness of 
INEDs may vary, and therefore the relationship between INEDs and firm valuation can be 
expected to be different from what has been found in the more advanced economies. Thus, 
an investigation of the effect of the presence of INEDs on firm value in emerging African 
markets, where there is a severe absence of reliable empirical evidence will be crucial in 
offering a more complete insights on the impact of INEDs on firm valuation (Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008).  
Therefore, and in this paper, we examine the association between the presence of 
INEDs and firm valuation for a sample of SA listed firms. The country offers an interesting 
setting to investigate the effect of INEDs on firm valuation. In line with other Anglo-Saxon 
economies, SA has carried out CG reforms, mainly in the shape of the King Reports with 
the key aim of improving the independence and monitoring capacity of corporate boards 
(Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Ntim, 2009; West, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011a). As 
will be further elaborated, and with particular respect to the composition of SA corporate 
boards, the 2002 King Report sets a much clearer and stricter test for classifying directors 
into executives, NEDs and INEDs for listed firms to comply with.  
The SA corporate setting, however, has unique features, including high institutional 
ownership, widespread block ownership, including government ones, but weak compliance 
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with corporate regulations and shareholder activism (Bar et al., 1995; Ntim and Osei, 2011). 
High block ownership, for example, can impair the efficacy of the market for corporate 
control (Arstmtrong et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2011a, b). This can arguably have adverse 
implications on whether companies will voluntarily comply with and disclose CG rules, 
including those relating to the appointment of INEDs, and thereby potentially limiting the 
ability of a voluntary code to enhance CG standards by improving the independence and 
monitoring capacity of SA corporate boards. Our contention, therefore, is that the rich 
research setting in terms of variations with matured economies, the recent CG reforms 
pursued and the acute lack of prior evidence provides a strong justification to investigate 
the association between the presence of INEDs and market valuation of SA listed firms. 
We contribute to the existing literature in many ways. Firstly, using a sample of 169 SA 
listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we offer evidence on the association between the presence 
of INEDs and firm valuation. As far as we are aware, it represents one of the first attempts 
at quantifying the effect of the presence of INEDs on corporate boards on firm valuation 
within an African setting, with specific regard to SA, and therefore critically extends the 
literature to that continent. It also contributes to the largely matured economies-based 
literature on the relationship between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. Secondly, 
and innovatively, we show that INEDs who meet a much stricter independence test 
positively influence firm valuation. Thirdly, we distinctively investigate the existence of 
potential non-linear relationship between INEDs and firm valuation. Fourthly, and different 
from most past studies, we rely on econometric techniques that adequately account for 
different types of endogeneity problems, including fixed-effects, as well as use different 
proxies of firm valuation.  
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Our findings suggest a statistically significant and positive association between the 
presence of INEDs and firm valuation. In contrast, we find no statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. Our results are robust across 
a raft of econometric models that address different kinds of endogeneity problems and firm 
valuation proxies. Our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which indicates 
that greater independence reduces agency problems by improving the ability of corporate 
boards to effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives, and thereby 
enhancing market valuation. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a brief 
overview of the CG reforms contained in the King Reports, INEDs and the SA corporate 
setting. Section 3 reviews the prior theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of the 
presence of INEDs on firm valuation. Section 4 presents the research design. Section 5 
reports empirical analyses, whereas section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. The King reports, INEDs and the SA corporate setting 
There is a consensus that the introduction of the King Reports explicitly 
institutionalised CG practices in SA (West, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011a). This began with the 
publication of the first King Report (King I) in 1994 (King Report, 2002; Ntim et al., 
2011b). The recommendations of King I were mainly influenced by those of the UK’s 
Cadbury Report of 1992 (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011). For instance, 
and in line with the Cadbury Report, King I recommended an Anglo-Saxon style single-tier 
board of directors, consisting of executive directors and NEDs, operating within a voluntary 
CG compliance framework (King Report, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006). With particular 
respect to NEDs, and similar to the Cadbury Report, it emphasised the special importance 
of NEDs in setting and maintaining high standards of CG (King Report, 1994; Ntim, 2009). 
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Unlike Cadbury, however, it recommended that SA corporate boards should have at least 
two rather than three NEDs of adequate calibre and independence.  
Also, and unlike the Cadbury Report, which specified that at least two of the NEDs 
should be independent, King I did not clearly define who constitutes independent director 
or the number of independent NEDs (INEDs) that SA corporate boards should have (West, 
2009; Ntim, 2009). King I also failed to insist on a truly INED to chair SA corporate boards 
(King Report, 2002; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). Arguably, these deviations 
from the Cadbury Report also increased potential conflicts of interests and impaired board 
independence and monitoring (King Report, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011a, b). As a result, King 
I was revised and replaced with a second King Report (King II) in 2002 with the aim of 
overcoming some of the weaknesses that have been outlined with King I.  
King II proposed several changes with regard to board composition. Firstly, and 
unlike King I, King II provided a clear classification of directors into executives, NEDs and 
INEDs with a stricter definition[2] of director independence (King Report, 2002; 
Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabase, 2002; Ntim, 2009). Second, and instead of two NEDs, 
King II recommended that the board should preferably consist of a majority of NEDs 
(Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2009). Thirdly, a majority of the NEDs should also be 
independent (i.e., INEDs) of management so that shareholders interests (including minority 
interests) can be better protected (King Report, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011b). Fourthly, and to 
ensure balance of power and authority in company decision-making, the chairman of the 
board should be an INED (King Report, 2002; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). The SA 
corporate context is, however, uniquely characterised by high block and institutional 
ownerships, largely in the form of complicated cross-shareholdings and tall pyramidical 
structures, but weak shareholder activism and enforcement of corporate laws (Barr et al., 
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1995; Ntim et al., 2011a). Consequently, critical concerns have been raised as to whether, 
given the SA corporate setting, a voluntary CG regime like King II will be effective in 
improving CG standards in the form of greater director independence and capacity to 
monitor corporate executives. Therefore, our objective is to examine whether King II 
recommendations relating to INEDs do influence firm valuation in SA.   
 
3. INEDs and firm valuation: theory, evidence and hypothesis development  
A CG mechanism that the theoretical literature suggests can be used in reducing 
agency and information asymmetry problems in modern corporations is the appointment of 
INEDs (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
However, there are two main contrasting views with respect to INEDs: those who are in 
favour of more INEDs on corporate boards and those who prefer more executive directors 
(Yermack, 1996; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). Those who support more INEDs on corporate 
boards usually base their arguments on a number of theories, including agency, resource 
independence, information asymmetry and reputation signaling (Pfeffer, 1973; Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1990; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009). Agency theory suggests that boards 
dominated by executive directors (insiders) are less accountable (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a, b; Sonnenfeld, 2002). In contrast, INEDs possess a number of features. First, 
they bring independent judgment to board decisions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Ntim, 
2009), which can impact positively on firm valuation. In particular, greater independence 
associated with INEDs grants them increased capacity to advise, monitor and discipline 
management to improve firm value by reducing managerial opportunism without fear or 
favour (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Jiraporn et al., 2009).   
Second, they provide their firms’ with resources in the form of experience, expertise, 
business contacts and reputation (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), 
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which can enhance firm valuation. Third, the existence of competitive and efficient 
managerial labour markets both within and outside the firm ensures that INEDs inherently 
perform their monitoring function more effectively (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a), 
and thereby improve firm value. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) argue that 
once top internal management gains control of a corporate board, they are more likely to 
connive and collude among themselves to engage in opportunistic activities, including 
expropriating shareholders’ wealth. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the 
possibility of such internal managerial connivance might be reduced, and the viability of 
the board as a market-induced mechanism for low-cost transfer of control might be 
enhanced, by the addition of INEDs (Fama, 1980, Fama, 1983a; Gupta and Fields, 2009).  
Finally, it has been argued that the appointment of INEDs helps in reducing 
information asymmetry by credibly signalling insiders’ intent to treat outside or potential 
shareholders fairly, and by implication, guaranteeing the safety of their investment 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009). It also signals to investors 
insiders’ intent to rely on expert advice, as well as their appreciation of the importance of 
separating the decision-making and control functions (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983a, b; Jensen, 1993; Dalton et al., 1998), which can impact positively on firm valuation.  
However, relying on stewardship theory, opponents argue that corporate boards 
dominated by INEDs may impact negatively on firm value (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Weir and Laing, 2000; Bozec, 2005). Weir and Laing (2000) contend that INEDs often 
command less knowledge about the business and find it too difficult to understand the 
complexities of the company. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that INEDs are 
usually part-timers who normally also sit on boards of other companies (Bozec, 2005; 
Jiraporn et al., 2009), which leaves them with too little time to devote to their advisory, 
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monitoring and disciplining duties (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Weir et al., 2002). By 
contrast, high levels of executive directorships are associated with high access to 
information that leads to high quality decision-making (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Weir et 
al., 2002; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003), with positive consequences firm valuation. Further, it 
has been argued that corporate boards dominated by INEDs tend to stifle managerial 
initiative and strategic actions (Pfeffer, 1973; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; McDonald et al., 
2008), which arise from excessive managerial supervision (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), and thereby leading to lower market valuation.  
Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature on INEDs, prior 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the presence of INEDs and firm 
valuation is mixed (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Yermack, 
1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Sunday, 2008). A strand of the empirical literature reports 
that boards dominated by INEDs are associated with higher market valuation (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Gupta and Fields, 2009). Using a sample of 311 UK listed firms from 
1994 to 1996, Weir et al. (2002) report a positive relationship between the percentage of 
INEDs and firm value. Gupta and Fields (2009) examine a US sample of 744 INED 
resignations from 1990 to 2003 to ascertain the value that the market places on board 
independence. They report that, on average, the announcement of INED resignations result 
in 1.22% loss in a firm’s market value. This suggests that investors value board 
independence as independent boards are associated with greater monitoring of managerial 
behaviour (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Jensen, 1993).  
Of close importance to this study, Ho and Williams (2003) find a statistically 
significant and positive link between the presence of INEDs and a firm’s physical and 
intellectual capital performance in 84 SA listed firms in 1998. Consistent with the evidence 
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of Ho and Williams (2003), Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a negative association 
between the presence of INEDs and the incidences of firm suspensions from the JSE in a 
sample of 81 firms from 1999 to 2005. This suggests that SA listed firms with a higher 
presence of INEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. Abor (2007) 
and Abor and Biekpe (2007) report a positive link between INEDs and financing decisions 
for a sample of Ghanaian listed firms. Similarly, Kyereboah-Coleman (2006b) and 
Kyereboah-Coleman et al. (2006) find a positive association between INEDs and firm value 
for a sample of Ghanaian listed firms. Further, El Mhendi (2007) and Mangena and 
Tauringana (2008) report evidence, which is entirely consistent with prior research that 
boards dominated by INEDs are highly valued for a sample of Tunisian and Zimbabwean 
listed firms, respectively.  
By contrast, a group of researchers reports that the presence of INEDs is negatively 
correlated with firm valuation (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Laing 
and Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). In a sample of 25 Canadian 
firms from 1976 to 2005, Bozec (2005) finds that the relationship between the presence of 
INEDs and firm valuation is negative. Using a sample of 47 Kenyan listed firms over the 
1999-2003 period, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) find that the presence of 
INEDs is negatively related to a firms’ financing decisions. Similarly, Sanda et al. (2010) 
report that Nigerian firms with a low percentage of INEDs were valued higher than those 
with more INEDs. This suggests that whilst INEDs can bring independence, objectivity and 
experience to bear upon board decisions (Gupta and Fields, 2009; Ben-Amar and Zeghal, 
2011), they may also stifle managerial initiative through excessive monitoring (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007).  
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A third stream of empirical studies (Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 
2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Bokpin, 2011), indicates that the presence of INEDs has 
no impact on firm value. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report no link 
between INEDs and firm valuation for a sample of 142 US listed firms. UK studies by 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir and Laing (2000) find that the wealth effects of 
INEDs are statistically insignificant. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a 
statistically insignificant relationship between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation for 
a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms. Further, Bokpin (2011) finds no significant link 
between the presence of INEDs and dividend performance for a sample of 23 Ghanaian 
listed firms from 2002 to 2007. 
With specific reference to SA, the 1973 Companies Act requires every public 
company to appoint at least two INEDs. King II and the JSE Listings Rules also require SA 
corporate boards of directors to consist of a majority of NEDs. King II further requires that 
the majority of the NEDs be independent (INEDs) of management to ensure that minority 
interests are adequately protected. This suggests that King II expects that firms with more 
INEDs on their boards to be valued higher than those with less INEDs. As has been 
previously discussed, the past SA evidence (albeit it indirect) also indicates that a greater 
percentage of INEDs on corporate boards may be associated with higher firm valuation (Ho 
and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). However, given the mixed international 
evidence, we predict a statistically significant association between the presence of INEDs 
and firm valuation without being specific about the direction of the sign. Therefore, the 
main hypothesis tested in this study is that: 
 H1: There is either a statistically significant negative or positive relationship 
between the presence of NEDs or INEDs and firm valuation. 
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4. Research design 
4.1 Sample and data 
A total of 402 firms from ten industries (i.e., basic materials, consumer goods, 
consumer services, financials, health care, industrials, oil & gas, technology, telecoms, and 
utilities) were listed on the JSE as at 31/12/2007. For regulatory and capital structure 
reasons, we excluded 111 financials and utilities, leaving us with 291 firms from eight non-
financial industries to be sampled. We required data on CG and financial variables to 
examine the link between INEDs and firm value. The CG variables were collected from the 
sampled companies’ annual reports. The annual reports were downloaded from the Perfect 
Information Database. We collected the financial data from DataStream. The companies in 
our final sample had to meet two criteria: the availability of a firm’s full five-year annual 
reports from 2002 to 2006; and the accessibility to a firm’s corresponding financial data 
from 2003 to 2007[3].   
The criteria were set for a number of reasons. First, and similar to previous studies 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; Beiner et al., 2006), the criteria enabled use to 
meet the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis. Some of the advantages that can 
be obtained for the use of panel data include having both time-series and cross-sectional 
observations, more degrees of freedom and less multi-collinearity among the variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003). Second, an examination of five-year data with both 
cross-sectional and time-series characteristics may help in discovering whether the 
observed cross-sectional association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation is 
robust over-time (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Ntim et al., 2011b). This can facilitate 
direct comparisons to be drawn with the results of past studies (Laing and Weir, 1999; 
Bozec, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Applying our selection criteria, we obtained the 
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full data required for a total of 169 firms over five-firm years and 8 industries for our 
empirical analysis.  
 
4.2 Dependent, independent and control variables 
This subsection discusses all the three main types of variables that we employ in our 
investigation, and Table 1 presents their full definitions. Firstly, we utilise two main 
independent variables for our regression analysis: the presence of NEDs and INEDs. 
Secondly, our main dependent variable or proxy for firm valuation is the widely used 
Tobin’s Q (Q). However, we use return on assets (ROA) and total share return (TSR) to 
check the sensitivity of our findings to alternative accounting and market-based firm value 
proxies, respectively. Finally, and similar to previous studies (Bozec, 2005; Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007), we add below a number of control variables. First, firms with higher 
investment opportunities tend to grow faster (Henry 2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011), and are 
more likely to be highly valued by the stock market. Thus, our expectation is that sales 
growth (GROWTH) will be positively associated with market valuation. Second, firms with 
greater investment in research and development can gain competitive advantages 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Gupta and Fields, 2009), and therefore may be highly 
valued by the stock market. In contrast, research and development is capital intensive 
activity (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000), and thus, may have a 
negative influence on market valuation.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Similarly, higher debt usage can enhance firm value by effectively reducing 
managerial capacity to expropriate ‘free cash flows’ (Jensen 1986; Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
By contrast, higher use of debt can increase the risk of financial distress, and impact 
negatively on firm value by reducing the capacity of firms to exploit growth opportunities 
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(Jensen, 1986; Ntim et al., 2011a). Also, and due to greater agency problems, bigger firms 
can be expected to have good CG structures (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 
2006), and as such may be more highly valued by the stock market. On the other hand, 
smaller firms tend to have higher investment and growth opportunities (Weir et al., 2002; 
Guest, 2009), and thus, may receive higher market valuation. Due to the mixed theoretical 
predictions, we hypothesise that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and firm 
size (LNTA) will correlate either negatively or positively to firm value. Third, firms that are 
cross-listed on international stock markets are more likely to have greater access to funds 
and investment opportunities (Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011b), and therefore may be valued 
more highly by the stock market. Thus, our prediction is that cross-listing (CROSLIST) will 
correlate positively to firm value. Fourth, it has been suggested that audit firm size is 
positively associated with auditor independence and audit quality (DeAngelo (1981; Ntim 
and Osei, 2011), and as such firms audited by large audit firms may have a positive 
association with firm value. Hence, our prediction is that audit firm size (BIG4) will 
correlate positively to firm value.  
Fifth, as government ownership provides access to critical resources, such as 
finance and profitable government contracts (Armstrong et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2011a), 
we predict that government ownership (GOVOWN) will be positively associated with 
market valuation. Sixth, firms that voluntarily establish CG committee to specifically 
monitor CG standards may have greater ability to minimise managerial capacity to extract 
corporate assets (Ntim et al., 2011b; Ntim and Osei, 2011), and therefore may receive 
higher market valuation. Therefore, our expectation is that the presence of a CG committee 
(CGCOM) will correlate positively to firm value. Finally, following prior studies (Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), we predict that firm will vary across 
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different industries and financial years. As such, we add industry (INDUST) dummies for 
the 5 remaining industries[4]: basic materials and oil & gas; consumer goods; consumer 
services and health care; industrials; and technology & telecoms; and year (YD) dummies 
for the financial years 2003 to 2007.  
 
5. Empirical analyses  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of all variables that we use in conducting our 
fixed-effects regressions. All values generally suggest a wide spread. For instance, and 
consistent with the findings of Beiner et al. (2006), Henry (2008) and Guest (2009), Q 
ranges from a minimum of 0.58 and a maximum of 3.58 with mean of 1.52, depicting wide 
variation. In terms of the CG variables in Panel B of Table 2, it is observable that 
irrespective of the statistics used, more SA firms have higher percentage of their board 
members as NEDs than INEDs. For example, whilst the average SA firm has 57% of its 
board members as NEDs, the corresponding figure for INEDs is only 28%.  Although our 
evidence is consistent with the reported results of previous studies for the percentage of 
NEDs (Yermack, 1996; Ho and Williams, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007) and INEDs 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gupta and Fields, 2009; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), it 
appears to suggests that more firms find it difficult to meet the new strict director 
independence test introduced by King II.  The alternative firm value measures (i.e., ROA 
and TSR), as well as the control variables (i.e., BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GEAR, 
GOVOWN, and GROWTH) suggest wide variations, an indication that our sample has been 
adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation, and therefore avoids any possibilities of 
sample selection bias.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
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We also tested linear regression assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. We tested the multicollinearity assumption by 
implementing the Spearman non-parametric and Pearson parametric bivariate correlation 
tests among the variables. The findings, which to save space are not reported, but available 
on request, indicated that no serious non-normalities and multicollinearities existed among 
the variables. Additionally, we investigated scatter, P-P and Q-Q plots, studentised 
residuals, Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics of the variables, and the tests also 
suggested no significant breach of the linear regression assumptions of homoscedasticity, 
linearity, normality and autocorrelation, indicating that it is appropriate to conduct 
multivariable regression analyses.    
 
5.2 Multivariate regression analyses 
Firms tend to vary in the threats and opportunities that they face over time (Henry, 
2008; Ntim et al., 2011b). This can result in scenario whereby NEDs or INEDs and Q are 
jointly and dynamically influenced by firm-specific variations, such as corporate culture, 
complexity and executive talent (Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2009), which simple OLS regressions 
may be unable to detect (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003), and thereby leading to 
spurious findings (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). Therefore, given the 
panel nature of our data, as well as following previous studies (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; 
Ntim et al., 2011b), we conduct fixed-effects regressions[5] in order to account for possible 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities. We begin our analysis with basic fixed-effects 
regression specified as follows: 
               

 
n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSINEDsQ
1
111110                     (1) 
where: Q is the main dependent variable, INEDs/NEDs are the main independent variables, 
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CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, CROSLIST, 
GEAR, GOVOWN, GROWTH, INDUST and YD, and δ refers to the firm-level fixed-effects, 
made up of a vector of 168 year dummies to represent the 169 sampled firms. 
Table 3 presents fixed-effects regressions results of the effect of the presence of 
NEDs or INEDs on Q. First, to ascertain whether the presence of NEDs influences Q, we 
run Q on the NEDs alone excluding the control variables using equation (1). Statistically 
insignificant and positive impact of NEDs on Q is noticeable in Model 1 of Table 3. 
However, the coefficient on the constant term in Model 1 of Table 3 is statistically 
significant and appears to indicate that the model may be suffering from omitted variables 
bias. Therefore, to check whether our finding is not spuriously caused by omitted variables 
bias, we include the control variables in Model 2 to account for potential omitted variables 
bias. Again, positive, but statistically insignificant effect of NEDs on Q is clearly 
observable in Model 2 of Table 3, and thereby failing to provide support for H1, but 
consistent with the findings of prior studies that report insignificant association between 
NEDs and firm valuation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; 
Weir and Laing, 2000). A possible explanation is that some NEDs tend to have significant 
interests or close connections with corporate management (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Gupta 
and Fields, 2009). This can impede their independence, and consequently their capacity to 
effectively monitor and discipline executives (Jensen, 1993; Jiraporn et al., 2009).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Second, and given our evidence of statistically insignificant effect of the presence of 
NEDs on Q, we re-run equation (1) by replacing NEDs with INEDs with and without the 
control variables, which provides a more subtle and strict definition of director 
independence and monitoring capacity. Statistically significant and positive of effect of 
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INEDs on Q is noticeable in Model 3 of Table 3. However, the coefficient on the constant 
term is statistically significant, indicating that there may be omitted variables bias. 
Therefore, to ascertain whether our evidence is not falsely driven by omitted variables bias, 
we re-estimate Model 3 by adding the control variables. The coefficient of INEDs on Q in 
Model 4 of Table 3 is statistically significant and positive, and thereby providing support 
for H1, as well as the recommendations of King II[6]. Our evidence also provides support 
for the results of past studies (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman et al., 2006; 
Gupta and Fields, 2009) that report a positive association between INEDs and firm 
valuation, but inconsistent with those that report a negative (Yermack, 1996; Laing and 
Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Theoretically, our results are in line 
with agency theoretical predictions, which suggest that more independent corporate boards 
have greater capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives 
(Fama, 1980; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993), and thereby enhancing firm value.  
Finally, and the coefficients on the control variables in Models 2 and 4 of Table 3 
are generally consistent with our predictions. For example and as expected, the coefficients 
on CAPEX, GEAR and LNTA are statistically significant and negatively associated with Q, 
whilst BIG4, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GOVOWN and GROWTH are statistically significant 
and positively related to Q, in Models 2 and 4. Finally, the F-values in Models 2 to 4 of 
Table 3 consistently reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the main independent 
and the control variables are equal to zero. In line with the findings of past studies 
(Yermack, 1996; Bozec, 2005; Gupta and Fields, 2009), the adjusted R
2
 is between 3% and 
35%, suggesting that our fixed-effects estimations can explain significant variations in our 
sampled firms’ Q. 
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5.3 Sensitivity analyses 
Our fixed-effects estimations so far do not take into consideration the existence of 
possible non-linear relationships and alternative firm valuation proxies, as well as other 
potential endogeneity problems. This suggests that the evidence of a significant positive 
association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation, for example, may be 
spurious. In this subsection, we examine how sensitive our results are to the presence of 
non-monotonic associations, alternative firm value measures and other endogeneities.  
First, to investigate whether there is a non-linear association between INEDs and 
firm value, such that either the presence of a small or large number of INEDs has a positive 
effect on Q, as predicted by Jensen (1993), we re-estimate equation (1) using squared 
(INEDs
2
) form of INEDs[7]. Positive, but statistically insignificant effect of INEDs
2
 on Q is 
observable in Model 5 of Table 3, and thereby suggesting that our evidence of a positive 
impact of the presence of INEDs on Q is robust to this specification. Second and as 
previously explained, we examine the sensitivity of our results to two alternative firm 
valuation proxies: return on assets (ROA – an accounting based proxy) and total share 
returns (TSR – a market based measure). Models 6 and 7 of Table 3 present findings 
obtained by using ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically significant and 
positive effect of INEDs on ROA and TSR in models 6 and 7 of Table 3, respectively, is 
noticeable, and thereby suggesting that our findings are insensitive to the use of either an 
accounting (ROA) or a market (TSR) based firm valuation proxy, instead of Q. 
Third, to address potential extra endogeneity problems that may be caused by 
omitted variable bias, we implement the extensively used two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
technique (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). However, to ensure that the 2SLS 
methodology appropriate, and following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. 
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(2006), we first conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006, p. 
267) to ascertain whether an endogenous relationship exists between Q and INEDs. Applied 
to equation (1), the test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and as such we conclude 
that the 2SLS technique may be appropriate and that our earlier findings based on the fixed-
effects estimations may be spurious.
 
In the first stage, we assume that INEDs will be 
influenced by the ten control variables (i.e., as exogenous variables) specified in equation 
(1). In the second stage, we utilise the predicted portion of the INEDs (PRE_INEDs) as an 
instrument for the INEDs and re-run equation (1) as specified below:
 
                              


n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSINEDsQ
1
10
ˆ                            (2) 
whereby everything remains the same as specified in equation (1)[8] except that we employ 
the predicted INEDs (PRE_INEDs) from the first-stage regression as an instrument for the 
INEDs. Statistically significant and positive effect of the PRE_INEDs on Q is clearly 
noticeably in Model 8 of Table 3, and thereby indicating that our evidence of a positive 
effect of INEDs on Q is not sensitive to endogeneity problems that may be caused by 
potential omitted variables. Overall, the sensitivity analyses suggest that our findings are 
fairly insensitive to different types of potential endogeneity problems, non-monotonic 
relationships and alternative firm valuation measures.  
   
6. Summary and conclusion  
 This paper has attempted to examine the association between the presence of 
independent non-executive directors (INEDs) and firm valuation using a sample of 169 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) from 2002 to 2007 in South Africa 
(SA). This coincides with a period during which the SA authorities embarked upon 
corporate governance (CG) reforms that mainly focused on raising CG standards in SA 
 
21 
 
 
firms by enhancing the independence and monitoring capacity of corporate boards, 
primarily in the shape of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports.  
Our findings suggest a positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between 
the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. In contrast, we find statistically significant and 
positive association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation. Additionally, we 
examine the existence of potential non-linear relationship between NEDs or INEDs and 
firm valuation, whereby either a relatively small or large number of NEDs or INEDs 
positively influences firm valuation as suggested by Jensen (1993), but we do not find any 
such statistically significant non-monotonic links. Our findings are consistent across a raft 
of econometric models that take into consideration different types of endogeneity problems 
and firm valuation proxies. Overall, our results provide empirical support for agency theory, 
which suggests that more independent corporate boards tend to have increased capacity to 
effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives, and thereby enhancing firm 
valuation.  
Our evidence also has important implications for policy-makers and regulatory 
authorities. Whilst our evidence that more independent corporate boards’ impacts positively 
on firm valuation provides support for the recommendations of the King Reports, it 
suggests that to be useful, director independence has to be more subtly and strictly defined. 
Further, and given that SA firms are far from having a majority of their board members 
being INEDs as recommended by the 2002 King Report, there is the need to strengthen 
compliance and enforcement. In this respect, establishing a “compliance and enforcement 
committee” to regularly check the levels of compliance among listed firms may help in 
improving CG standards. 
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Notes 
1. For example, Sunday’s (2008) study was based only on 20 Nigerian listed firms from 200 to 2006, whilst 
Kyereboah-Coleman and and Biekpe (2006a) used 47 Kenyan listed firms from 1999 to 2003. Samples used by 
other studies, such as Kyereboah-Coleman et al. (2006), Kyereboah and Biekpe (2006a), Abor (2007) and 
Bokpin (2011), amongst others, are well below 30 firms. 
2. King II requires firms to clearly define and classify directors into three main types: executive, NED and INED. 
First, an executive director refers to an individual who is involved in the day-to-day management and/or is a 
full-time salaried employee of the company or its subsidiaries. Second, a NED is defined as an individual who is 
not involved in the day-to-day management and is not a full-time salaried employee of the company or its 
subsidiaries. Third, an INED is strictly defined as a NED who: (1) is not a representative of a shareholder; (2) 
has not been employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; (3) is not a member of 
the immediate family of an individual who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive 
position in the past three financial years; (4) is not a professional advisor to the company; (5) is not a significant 
supplier to or customer of the company; (6) has no significant contractual relationship with the company; and (7) 
is free from any business or other relationship which could be seen to materially interfere with the individual’s 
capacity to act in an independent manner (King Report, 2002, para. 2.4). 
3. Corporate board decisions take time in order to be reflected in firm value (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 
2011b; Ntim and Osei, 2011). Therefore, to avoid endogenous association between the presence of INEDs and 
firm valuation, we introduce a one year lag between INEDs and firm valuation such that this year’s firm value 
depends on last year’s governance structure (INEDs) similar to Weir et al. (2002) and Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), as specified in equation (1). The sample also starts from 2002 for two reasons. First, King II came into 
operation in 2002, and secondly, data coverage in Perfect Information/DataStream on SA listed firms is very 
limited until 2002. The sample ends in 2007 because it is the year for which data is available.  
4. Due to insufficient number of observations in 3 industries, namely health care, oil and gas, and telecoms 
industries with three, one and three listed companies, respectively, were merged with the closest remaining five 
major industries. Consequently, the three health care companies were included in the consumer services 
industry, the one oil and gas firm was added to the basic materials industry, whilst the three telecoms firms 
were also shared out to the technology industry. 
5. However, we note that our choice is between random and fixed-effects estimation techniques. Therefore, to 
ensure that fixed-effects model is appropriate, we first conduct Hausman (1978) specification test by estimating 
both fixed and random-effects models for the NEDs or INEDs separately using equation (1) and comparing their 
respective coefficients. Under the null hypothesis of consistent random unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (i.e., 
unobserved firm-specific effects or the regressions errors are uncorrelated with the independent variables), 
random-effects estimates will be both consistent and efficient, whilst fixed-effects coefficients will be consistent, 
but inefficient (Hausman, 1978; Woodridge, 2002). In contrast, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then the fixed-
effects approach will provide both consistent and efficient estimates, whereas random-effects estimates will be 
both inconsistent and biased (Hausman, 1978; Gujarati, 2003). The test consistently rejects the null hypothesis 
of consistent random effects for both models at the 1% level, providing further empirical support for our 
decision to rely primarily on fixed-effects models. 
6. As NEDs are statistically insignificant in our models, all our subsequent estimations and discussions will be 
based on INEDs, instead NEDs. 
7. We conducted similar non-linear investigation for the NEDs proxy and found statistically insignificant non-
monotonic link between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. We also explored other forms of non-
monotonic transformations, such as cubing the variables (i.e., NEDs or INEDs), but we found statistically 
insignificant association between the presence of NEDs or INEDs and firm valuation. 
8. As estimating a lagged structure will invalidate the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 
2003), we estimate equation (2) as un-lagged structure. An additional advantage is that it allows us to ascertain 
the robustness of our results against estimating an un-lagged structure.  
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Table 1. Summary of variables 
Firm valuation/dependent variables 
Q The ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to 
total assets.   
ROA  The percentage of operating profit to total assets.  
TSR The percentage of annualised total share returns made up of share price and 
dividends.  
Corporate governance/independent variables 
NEDs  The percentage of all non-executive directors (all outside directors) to total  
number of directors on a corporate board.  
INEDs The percentage of NEDs who: are not representatives of a shareholder; have 
not been employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three 
financial years; are not members of the immediate family of an individual 
who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position 
in the past three financial years; are not professional advisors to the 
company; are not significant suppliers to or customers of the company; have 
no significant contractual relationship with the company; and are free from 
any business or other relationship which could be seen to materially interfere 
with the individual’s capacity to act in an independent manner.  
Control variables 
BIG4 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is audited by a big four 
audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, 
and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CAPEX The percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets.  
CROSLIST A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed on a  
foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
CGCOM A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate  
governance committee, 0 otherwise.  
GEAR  The percentage of total debts to market value of equity.   
GOVOWN A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at  
least 5%, 0 otherwise.  
GROWTH The percentage of the current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last  
                        year’s sales.  
LNTA  The natural log of total assets. 
INDUST Industry dummies for the five main remaining industries. 
YD  Year dummies from 2003 to 2007 inclusive. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of all variables for all (845) firm years 
Variable   Mean            Median           Std. dev.       Maximum        Minimum 
Panel A: Firm valuation (Dependent) variables 
Q                 1.52    1.33    0.69               3.58               0.58  
ROA (%)                      10.26             10.97  12.21  36.55            -23.19  
TSR (%)              33.57              29.60             48.68            173.41            -55.20 
Panel B: Corporate governance (Independent) variables 
NEDs (%)   57.39  60.00             17.20              00.00            100.00 
INEDs (%)                   28.43              28.57               23.24                00.00               83.33 
Panel C: Control variables 
BIG4 (%)                     73.25            100.00                44.29              100.00                 0.00 
CAPEX (%)              11.08   6.28  13.86    64.46                0.00 
CGCOM (%)   35.80   0.00  48.00            100.00                0.00 
CROSLIST (%)  21.66   0.00  41.21            100.00                0.00 
GEAR (%)              34.78            14.63             55.02            270.65                0.00 
GOVOWN (%)             38.00   0.00  49.00            100.00                0.00 
GROWTH (%)  14.40            12.60             24.94             88.26             -41.88 
LNTA      5.95               5.97                  0.89                  7.60                 4.08 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  Return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating 
profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total share returns made up of 
share price and dividends. Non-executive directors (NEDs), measured as the percentage of all non-executive 
directors (all outside directors) to total number of directors on a board. Independent NEDs (INEDs), is strictly 
defined as a NED who: are not representatives of a shareholder; have not been employed in any executive 
capacity for the preceding three financial years; are not members of the immediate family of an individual 
who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position in the past three financial years; 
are not professional advisors to the company; are not significant suppliers to or customers of the company; 
have no significant contractual relationship with the company; and are free from any business or other 
relationship which could be seen to materially interfere with the individual’s capacity to act in an independent 
manner. Audit firm size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is audited 
by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 
otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPEX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
Cross-listing (CROSLIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed to 
a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. The presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), defined as 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
Gearing (GEAR), calculated as the ratio of total debts to market value of equity. Government ownership 
(GOVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 
0 otherwise. Sales growth (GROWTH), calculated as the current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last 
year’s sales. Firm size (LNTA), measured as the natural log of total assets. 
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Table 3. Fixed-effects regressions of the effect of independent non-executive directors on firm valuation 
Dependent variables Q Q Q Q Q ROA TSR 2SLS (Q) 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
(N) 
      0.012 
    3.078
*** 
(845) 
        0.256 
   7.263*** 
(845) 
         0.032 
  5.270*** 
         (845) 
        0.349 
   9.780*** 
(845) 
       0.268 
 8.504*** 
(845) 
      0.365 
    10.290*** 
       (845) 
0.374  
   10.629*** 
 (845) 
     0.390 
   11.152*** 
(845) 
Constant      1.048 
    (0.000)
*** 
        1.092 
      (0.000)*** 
        1.364 
       (0.000)*** 
        1.638 
       (0.000)*** 
       1.126 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.160 
  (0.530) 
        2.587 
       (0.000)*** 
     2.056 
  (0.000)*** 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NEDs 
 
INEDs
 
 
INEDs
2 
 
PRE_INEDs 
     0.004 
    (0.269) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
        0.002 
      (0.298) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.049 
   (0.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
             - 
             - 
         0.045 
        (0.012)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
        0.005 
       (0.237) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.534 
    (0.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 0.604 
       (0.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
      0.068 
     (0.000)*** 
Control variables  
BIG4 
 
CAPEX 
 
CGCOM 
 
CROSLIST 
 
GEAR 
 
GOVOWN 
 
GROWTH 
 
LNTA 
 
INDUST 
YD 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
       0.140 
      (0.020)** 
      -0.010 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.194 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.110 
      (0.059)* 
      -0.018 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.102 
      (0.018)** 
       0.124 
      (0.015)** 
      -0.136 
      (0.019)** 
     Included 
     Included 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
         0.189 
        (0.000)*** 
        -0.008 
        (0.013)** 
         0.247 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.271 
        (0.000)*** 
        -0.006 
        (0.020)** 
         0.295 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.180 
        (0.000)*** 
        -0.294 
        (0.000)*** 
        Included 
        Included 
       0.153 
      (0.017)** 
      -0.012 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.198 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.113 
      (0.052)* 
      -0.024 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.104 
      (0.023)** 
       0.127 
      (0.013)** 
      -0.142 
      (0.011)** 
      Included 
      Included 
      0.207 
     (0.000)*** 
     -0.058 
     (0.000)*** 
      1.180 
     (0.020)** 
      0.368 
     (0.039)** 
     -0.535 
     (0.000)*** 
      3.420 
     (0.000)*** 
      0.264 
     (0.000)*** 
     -2.830 
     (0.000)*** 
     Included 
     Included 
0.230 
   (0.000)*** 
-0.006 
   (0.020)** 
2.080 
   (0.000)*** 
2.810 
    (0.000)*** 
-0.005 
  (0.063)* 
4.604 
    (0.000)*** 
0.320 
    (0.000)*** 
   -3.629*** 
(0.000) 
Included 
Included 
0.210 
    (0.000)*** 
     -0.016 
    (0.000)*** 
0.260 
    (0.000)*** 
0.292 
   (0.000)*** 
 -0.018*** 
(0.000) 
    0.410*** 
(0.000) 
    0.196*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.387*** 
(0.000) 
Included 
Included 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using 
the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s (Q), return on assets (ROA), total share return (TSR), the percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), the 
percentage of independent NEDs (INEDs),  INEDs squared (INEDs2), predicted  INEDs (PRE_INEDs) – obtained by regressing INEDs on the control variables and used as an instrument for the INEDs 
in model 8, audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), gearing (GEAR), government ownership 
(GOVOWN), firm size (LNTA), industry dummies (INDUST), and year dummies (YD). Tables I and II fully define all the variables used. 
